SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT

JOHN LOCKE (1623-1704)

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John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government presented a critique of the divine right of kings and outlined the principles of natural rights and government by consent. Written during the 1670s, they were not published until after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the passage of the English Bill of Rights in 1689. Locke was the political theorist quoted most frequently by Americans in the 1770s.

Chapter II. Of the state of nature.

4. To understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must consider what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions, and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature; without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.

A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection; unless the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undisputed right to dominion and sovereignty....

6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence: though man in that state have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker; all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about his business; they are his

property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not another's pleasure: and being
furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be supposed
any such subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy another, as if we were made
for one another's uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for ours. Every one, as he is bound to
preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own preserva-
tion comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and
may not, unless it be to do justice to an offender, take away or impair the life, or what tends to
the preservation of life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.

7. And that all men may be restrained from invading others’ rights, and from doing hurt to one
another, and the law of nature be observed, which willeth the peace and preservation of all man-
kind, the execution of the law of nature is, in that state, put into every man’s hands, whereby every
one has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree as may hinder its violation:
for the law of nature would, as all other laws that concern men in this world, be in vain, if there
were nobody that in the state of nature had a power to execute that law, and thereby preserve the
innocent and restrain offenders. And if any one in the state of nature may punish another for any
evil he has done, every one may do so: for in that state of perfect equality, where naturally there
is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another, what any may do in prosecution of that law,
every one must needs have a right to do.

8. And thus, in the state of nature, “one man comes by a power over another;” but yet no absolute
or arbitrary power, to use a criminal, when he has got him in his hands, according to the passion-
ate heats, or boundless extravagancy of his own will; but only to retribute to him, so far as calm
reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his transgression; which is so much as may
serve for reparation and restraint: for these two are the only reasons, why one man may lawfully
do harm to another, which is that we call punishment. In transgressing the law of nature, the
offender declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common equity, which
is that measure God has set to the actions of men, for their mutual security; and so he becomes
dangerous to mankind, the tie, which is to secure them from injury and violence, being slighted
and broken by him. Which being a trespass against the whole species, and the peace and safety of
it, provided for by the law of nature; every man upon this score, by the right he hath to preserve
mankind in general, may restrain, or, where it is necessary, destroy things noxious to them, and so
may bring such evil on any one, who hath transgressed that law, as may make him repent the doing
of it, and thereby deter him, and by his example others, from doing the like mischief. And in this
case, and upon this ground, “every man hath a right to punish the offender, and be executioner
of the law of nature.”....

Chapter VIII. Of the beginning of political societies.

95. Men being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put
out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent. The
only way, whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil
society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community, for their comfortable,
safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a
greater security against any, that are not of it. This any number of men may do, because it injures
not the freedom of the rest; they are left as they were in the liberty of the state of nature. When any number of men have so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest....

Chapter IX. Of the ends of political society and government.

123. If man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to nobody, why will he part with his freedom? Why will he give up his empire, and subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of others; for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates, which I call by the general name, property.

124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property. To which in the state of nature there are many things wanting....

Chapter XI. Of the extent of the legislative power.

134. The great end of men's entering into society being the enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety, and the great instrument and means of that being the laws established in that society; the first and fundamental positive law of all commonwealths is the establishing of the legislative power; as the first and fundamental natural law, which is to govern even the legislative itself, is the preservation of the society, and (as far as will consist with the public good) of every person in it. This legislative is not only the supreme power of the commonwealth, but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the community have once placed it; nor can any edict of any body else, in what form soever conceived, or by what power soever backed, have the force and obligation of a law, which has not its sanction from that legislative which the public has chosen and appointed; for without this the law could not have that, which is absolutely necessary to its being a law, the consent of the society; over whom nobody can have a power to make laws, but by their own consent, and by authority received from them. And therefore all the obedience, which by the most solemnities any one can be obliged to pay, ultimately terminates in this supreme power, and is directed by those laws which it enacts; nor can any oaths to any foreign power whatsoever, or any domestic subordinate power, discharge any member of the society from his obedience to the legislative, acting pursuant to their trust; nor oblige him to any obedience contrary to the laws so enacted, or farther than they do allow; it being ridiculous to imagine one can be tied ultimately to obey any power in the society, which is not supreme....

142. These are the bounds which the trust, that is put in them by the society and the law of God and nature, have set to the legislative power of every commonwealth, in all forms of government.
First, they are to govern by promulgated established laws, not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favorite at court, and the countryman at plow.

Secondly, These laws also ought to be designed for no other end ultimately, but the good of the people.

Thirdly, they must not raise taxes on the property of the people, without the consent of the people, given by themselves or their deputies. And this properly concerns only such governments where the legislative is always in being, or at least where the people have not reserved any part of the legislative to deputies, to be from time to time chosen by themselves.

Fourthly, The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to any body else, or place it any where, but where the people have....

Chapter XIX. Of the dissolution of government.

222. The reason why men enter into society, is the preservation of their property; and the end why they choose and authorize a legislative, is, that there may be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to the properties of all the members of the society: to limit the power, and moderate the dominion, of every part and member of the society: for since it can never be supposed to be the will of the society, that the legislative should have a power to destroy that which every one designs to secure by entering into society, and for which the people submitted themselves to legislators of their own making; whenever the legislators endeavor to take away and destroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with the people, who are thereupon absolved from any farther obedience, and are left to the common refuge, which God hath provided for all men, against force and violence. Whosoever therefore the legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society; and either by ambition, fear, folly or corruption, endeavor to grasp themselves, or put into the hands of any other, an absolute power over the lives, liberties, and estates of the people; by this breach of trust they forfeit the power the people had put into their hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the people, who have a right to resume their original liberty, and, by the establishment of a new legislative, (such as they shall think fit) provide for their own safety and security, which is the end for which they are in society. What I have said here, concerning the legislative in general, holds true also concerning the supreme executor, who having a double trust put in him, both to have a part in the legislative, and the supreme execution of the law, acts against both, when he goes about to set up his own arbitrary will as the law of the society. He acts also contrary to his trust, when he either employs the force, treasure, and offices of the society, to corrupt the representatives, and gain them to his purposes; or openly pre-engages the electors, and prescribes to their choice, such, whom he has, by solicitations, threats, promises, or otherwise, won to his designs: and employs them to bring in such, who have promised beforehand, what to vote, and what to enact....